Between late March and mid-April 2026, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto conducted a four-country diplomatic tour spanning Japan, South Korea, Russia, and France, using each summit to advance energy supply diversification, transition technology cooperation, and strategic resource partnerships as the Strait of Hormuz closure disrupted Indonesia’s established crude and LPG supply chains.
The visits produced USD 23.63 billion in Indonesia-Japan business agreements, a bilateral partnership elevation with South Korea, a crude and LPG supply deal with Russia, and a widened set of cooperation frameworks across geothermal, LNG, critical minerals, nuclear, and carbon capture sectors — all against a domestic backdrop in which Pertamina tankers remained stranded in the Persian Gulf and Indonesia’s 2026 fuel subsidy budget was built on a crude price assumption more than USD 30 per barrel below actual market levels.
Key Facts At A Glance
- Japan visit: March 29–31, 2026; USD 23.63 billion in business agreements signed, covering the Masela gas field (Abadi LNG project), Rajabasa geothermal, Hululais geothermal, a Bontang carbon-to-methanol project, and memoranda of cooperation on critical minerals and nuclear energy
- South Korea visit: March 31–April 1, 2026; bilateral relationship elevated to Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership; high-level Energy Resources Security Dialogue agreed; South Korea cited Indonesia’s role as an LNG and coal supplier as “very reassuring”
- Russia visit: April 13, 2026; Kremlin summit with President Putin followed by April 14 ministerial meeting between Bahlil Lahadalia and Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilev; crude supply agreement described as “almost final” as of April 16–17; LPG negotiations require two to three additional rounds
- Russia deal scope: crude supply through December 2026; four Russian companies involved — Rosneft, Ruschem, Zarubezhneft, and Lukoil; Pertamina requires technical assessment before processing Russian crude in its refineries
- Indonesia’s 2026 LPG demand: 10 million tons projected; domestic production: 1.6 million tons; import gap: 8.4 million tons; previously sourced 70–75 percent from the United States and 20 percent from the Middle East
- Domestic budget strain: Indonesia’s 2026 fuel subsidy allocation is 381.3 trillion rupiah (approximately USD 22.5 billion), calculated on crude oil at approximately USD 70 per barrel; actual prices were running at approximately USD 102 per barrel as of mid-April
- Two Pertamina International Shipping tankers — Pertamina Pride and Gamsunoro — remained stranded in the Persian Gulf as of mid-April, awaiting safe passage
The Japan LEG: LNG, Geothermal, And A Longer Horizon
Prabowo’s visit to Tokyo from March 29 to 31 opened the diplomatic sequence and set its broadest framing. At a bilateral summit on March 31 at Akasaka Palace, Prabowo and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi agreed to deepen cooperation on energy security, citing the strategic importance of supply chain resilience in light of the Iran war. The two leaders agreed on advancing geothermal and waste-to-energy cooperation under the Asia Zero Emission Community framework.
The business agreements signed at the Indonesia-Japan Business Forum at the Imperial Hotel Tokyo totaled USD 23.63 billion and spanned the energy value chain from upstream through transition infrastructure. Among the most consequential was a strategic partnership between state-owned Pertamina and Japanese firm INPEX for development of the Abadi gas field in the Masela Block, a long-delayed project whose acceleration signals that both Jakarta and Tokyo view the Hormuz crisis as a catalyst rather than an obstacle for long-term upstream gas investment. A separate agreement between PT Pertamina Hulu Energi and INPEX covered exploration opportunities in Indonesia and Southeast Asia more broadly.
On the renewable side, a deal between PT Supreme Energy Rajabasa and INPEX advanced studies for the Rajabasa geothermal power plant. A Bontang methanol project using captured carbon dioxide was also included in the package — an early-stage demonstration of carbon utilization infrastructure in Indonesia’s industrial base.
The Japan leg thus covered both the emergency horizon — LNG supply chain continuity — and the structural horizon: clean energy technology, upstream gas development, and the raw material pathways that underpin an energy transition.
South Korea: Resource Security And Partnership Elevation
Prabowo traveled directly from Tokyo to Seoul, where his visit from March 31 to April 1 elevated the Indonesia-South Korea relationship to a Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for inclusive growth and shared prosperity. A joint statement published by Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 8 confirmed both leaders’ commitment to accelerating a high-level Energy Resources Security Dialogue and expanding public-private cooperation channels to keep global energy supply chains stable.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung was direct about the strategic rationale on the South Korean side. “We view Indonesia’s stable role in supplying key energy resources such as LNG and coal as very reassuring,” Lee said, calling for closer cooperation on energy supply and resource security amid global uncertainty. The two sides signed preliminary agreements covering renewable energy and data center projects. Indonesia is one of the world’s largest thermal coal exporters and a significant LNG supplier to Northeast Asia, with approximately a quarter of its LNG shipments destined for Japan — a position that gives Jakarta structural leverage in supply security conversations.
The Russia Pivot: Crude And LPG Supply Diversification
The most geopolitically significant leg of the circuit was the April 13 Kremlin meeting between Prabowo and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders agreed to strengthen bilateral ties in energy and investment, with Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya confirming discussions specifically covered energy, mineral resources, and national industrial development.
The ministerial follow-up on April 14, between Energy Minister Bahlil Lahadalia and Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilev, produced the concrete supply commitments. Bahlil confirmed that representatives of Rosneft, Ruschem, Zarubezhneft, and Lukoil were present at the negotiations. On April 16–17 in Jakarta, Bahlil characterized the crude supply deal as “almost final” and targeted the first shipments for April 2026. He confirmed that Russian crude would transit via Pacific Far East ports through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca — a route already used to supply China and other Asian buyers — bypassing the Hormuz chokepoint entirely.
The LPG dimension remains unresolved. Bahlil said LPG negotiations require two to three additional communication stages. The scale of the import gap is acute: Indonesia’s 2026 LPG demand is projected at 10 million tons against domestic production capacity of only 1.6 million tons. The 8.4 million-ton import requirement had been filled primarily by the United States and the Middle East — both sources now disrupted or re-routed.
Pertamina spokesperson Muhammad Baron stated the company would follow government directives but stressed that technical assessment of Russian crude compatibility with Pertamina’s refinery configuration is still required. Pertamina operates refineries including the Balikpapan Refinery Development Master Program facility, whose crude processing specifications were built around established Middle Eastern and domestic grades.
Domestic Fiscal And Supply Strain
The diplomatic circuit unfolded against an increasingly stressed domestic position. Indonesia’s 2026 national budget allocated 381.3 trillion rupiah (approximately USD 22.5 billion) for petrol and diesel subsidies, calculated on a crude oil price assumption of approximately USD 70 per barrel. By mid-April, crude prices were running at approximately USD 102 per barrel, a gap that is being absorbed initially by Pertamina but will ultimately fall on the government budget. As of late March, Indonesia’s fiscal deficit had already reached close to 1 percent of GDP, ahead of recent historical experience.
Two Pertamina International Shipping tankers — the VLCC Pertamina Pride, carrying light crude oil for Indonesia’s domestic supply, and Gamsunoro, serving a third-party cargo — remained stranded in the Persian Gulf throughout this period, awaiting safe passage through the Hormuz strait. The Indonesian government was in diplomatic contact with Iran regarding passage, while maintaining publicly that domestic fuel stocks remained sufficient.
Prabowo’s stated rationale for the travel pace was blunt. Addressing his cabinet on approximately April 8, he said: “Brothers and sisters, it’s to secure oil, I have to go everywhere.” That framing captured the emergency dimension. But analysis from The Diplomat and The Jakarta Post noted that the circuit also accelerated a pre-existing strategy: geothermal development, upstream gas investment, renewable energy deployment, and critical minerals partnerships that Jakarta had been pursuing before the Hormuz crisis made them urgent.
The question of whether Indonesia can hold its non-aligned foreign policy posture while simultaneously deepening supply ties with Russia — a state under comprehensive Western sanctions — and maintaining the new defense partnership with the United States announced the same day as the Putin meeting remains an open diplomatic challenge with direct implications for energy investment flows.